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Weaver: Cumulative Scaling as a Method for Analyzing Judicial Behavior -

CUMULATIVE SCALING AS A METHOD FOR
ANALYZING JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
A CRITIQUE AND AN EXAMPLE
MICHAEL R. WF-AVER*

Since C. Herman Pritchett's seminal work, The Roosevelt Court, A
Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937-1947,1 a near revolution has

taken place in the study of what has been traditionally known as the
field of public law. Beginning in the 1950's, a group of post World War
II trained political scientists began to apply the theory and methodology
of allied disciplines in an effort to create a political science of public law.
Essentially, these scholars are asking why the Supreme Court makes the
decisions that it does and not what decisions has the Supreme Court
made.2
The disciplines which the judicial behavioralists have most heavily
borrowed from are Sociology, Economics, and Psychology. Sociology
has provided group theory, applied and reflected in the work of Walter
Murphy 3 and Eloise Snyder. 4 The rational calculus in decision-making
has been taken over from economic theory and employed primarily by
Glendon Schubert 5 From psychology has come cumulative scaling, a
methodology which measures the intensity and consistency of individual
attitudes. Again, Schubert is the leading political scientist utilizing this
tool in the study of judicial decision-making.'
* Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Brockport.
1 New York, Macmillan, 1948.
' Glendon, Schubert, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior, Glencoe,
The Free Press, 1959, p. 11.
3 See his Elements of Judicial Strategy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1964.
"Political Power and the Ability to Win Supreme Court Decisions," Social
Forces, 39 (1960), pp. 36-40; "The Supreme Court as a Small Group," Social
Forces, 36 (1958), pp. 232-38; "Uncertainty and the Supreme Court's Decisions,"
American Journal of Sociology, 65 (1959), pp. 241-45.
5 Schubert has applied game theory to the question of granting certiorari in
F.E.L.A. petitions. See his Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior, pp. 210254. This study has been extended in his article, "Policy Without Law: An Extension of the Certiorari Game," STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 14 (1962), pp. 284327. In addition, Schubert has used game theory in analyzing the roles of Chief
justice Hughes and Justice Roberts in the "revolution" that occurred on the Court
in 1937. See Schubert, op. cit., pp. 192-210.
8 Schubert's magnum
opus using the scaling technique is in his The Judicial
Mind, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1965.
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This paper will focus on cumulative scaling as a research tool of judicial
behavior. In general, we are interested in whether the scaling technique
is a fruitful method of inquiry leading to increased understanding of the
judicial decision-making process. Clearly, if the new methodology does
not provide us with new knowledge, the investment of resources necessary
to learn and employ the techniques has been wasted.
Our approach in this paper is threefold:
(1) An explanation of the scaling technique and what it purports to
demonstrate
(2) A critique of the methodological assumptions underlying this
approach
(3) Exemplification of the tool through the presentation of a scalogram
based on Supreme Court decisions concerning obscenity from 1957
to 1966.
Scalogram analysis was first developed by Louis Guttman for the
study of the attitudes of soldiers during World War 1I.7 It presumes that
a specific attitude can be isolated and that a series of questions concerning that attitude will evoke a consistent reply on the part of the respondent.
A simple example (one not dealing with an attitude, however) will
illustrate the underlying logic of the technique. If we asked a person who
was six feet tall whether he was at least five feet tall, five and one-half
feet tall, and six feet tall, we would expect affirmative responses to all
three questions and a negative response to the subsequent question of
whether he was over six feet in height. Similarly, we postulate that a
series of Supreme Court cases centering on some specific question, say the
deprivation of a civil liberty, will evoke a set of generally consistent
responses from a given justice depending upon the extent and degree of
deprivation outlined in the facts of the case. However, given imperfect
information, faulty communications, and the possibility of other variables
intervening, we would not expect a perfect set of responses. Whether
the attitude we are scaling does in fact scale depends then upon the application of two statistical tests, the Coefficient of Reproducibility and the
Coefficient of Scalability.
If we turn to the obscenity decisions for a moment, we would expect
that a justice who insists that there be no restrictions on freedom of
expression would consistently vote against governmental programs of
' Samuel Stauffer et al., The American Soldier: Studies in Social Psychology
in World War II; Vol. IV: Measurement and Prediction, Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1950.
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regulation notwithstanding whether they were extreme or moderate.
For another less rigid justice, scaling should reveal his breaking point
where he shifts from voting in favor of the right to read to the consideration of the needs of the society. Finally, a justice who believes that any
literary reference to sex is inimical to the interests of the society could
be expected to respond positively to all censorship efforts by the government.
Before a scalogram can be constructed, it is necessary to define the
primary variable to be tested. We are interested in whether the Court
as a collectivity and the justices as individuals have a consistent position
on the extent to which Americans have the right to read literature and
view films which contain references to sexual activity. We were led
to this question after having read the decisions in chronological order
and from that approach finding what appeared to be uncertainty and inconsistency on the part of the court as well as certain individual justices.
If the obscenity cases do scale, then our hypothesis is negated. The
formulation of hypotheses to be tested is a problem independent of scalogram construction and design, although an understanding of scalogram
theory and method would appear to be essential to the formulation of
reasonable hypotheses.
The first step in constructing the scalogram is to list the votes of all
justices in each case. In our example, a vote in favor of the defendant or
the plaintiff is a vote in favor of the right of unrestricted reading. Conversely, a vote against the defendant indicates a restrictive attitude.
Next, the cases are grouped according to the division of the Court
in the following way. The 9-10 cases, followed by 8-1, 7-2, 6-3, 5-4, 4-5,
3-6, 2-7, 1-8, 0-9. The position of any given case on the scale is a
function of the manner in which the Court divided on the question.
Theoretically, the assumption in scaling is that the total vote of the
Court determines how extreme the deprivation of the individual's right
was. A unanimous court voting in favor of the defendant implies severe
deprivation. A unanimous Court voting against the defendant suggests
a frivolous appeal with virtually no deprivation. An 8-1 split implies
greater deprivation than a 7-2 split, and so on. In other words, we have
postulated that the degree (or extent) of deprivation is directly related
to the Court's division.
In cases where less than a full Court has participated, the decision
is grouped with the most nearly corresponding full court division. For
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example, a 6-2 split is grouped either with the 7-2 or 6-3 category. We
can sometimes decide which specific group the decision ought to be
associated with by reviewing the non-participating justice's past voting
record. We make the following rule for 4-3, 4-2, 2-4, and 3-4 splits.
They must always be grouped in a way which does not alter the actual
outcome. For example, a 4-3 division must be grouped with the 6-3 or
5-4 cases and never with the 4-5 group. The reason for this requirement
is that, for most primary variables a student will want to scale, the distinction between pro and con cases is critical to the interpretation of the
scalogram.
Clearly, the theory underlying the grouping of cases is of questionable
validity. Can we be confident that a voting division of 9-0 rather than
5-4 indicates the existence of greater deprivation in the first rather than
the second case? Tannehaus points out that such divisions can often be
explained just as plausibly in a variety of other ways.'
To take but one illustration, whether a civil liberties issue of high,
moderate, or low intensity results in a unanimously favorable, unanimously unfavorable, or sharply divided court can well depend on the
presence of other dimensions such as serious jurisdictional problems,
federalism, the overruling of previous precedent, the exercise of executive power in crisis, a competing civil liberty, and the like.
In other words, the validity of scaling Supreme Court decisions
hinges upon a methodological assumption which may be at least partially
unreliable.9
Having systematically arranged the cases according to the technique
just outlined, the next step is to rank the justices according to their scale
position. We define scale position for any justice as the number of the
last scaled case in which he consistently voted positive. By consistency,
we require that of the responses to the left of his scale position, at least
half are positive, and to the right of his scale position at least half are
negative. Scanning Table I, we note that Justice Harlan is the only one
to whom we must apply the rule and he meets our requirements since
more than half of his votes to the left of his scale position are positive.
' Joseph Tannehaus, "The Cumulative Scaling of Judicial Decisions," 79
1591 (1966).

HAR-

VARD LAW REVIEW

' Schubert, having anticipated this criticism, answers in the following way:
"We think that the manifestly high pitch of intensity frequently expressed in 5-4
marginal decisions must be explained in terms of the reinforcing effects of the
dynamics of group behavior, rather than as a function of the intensity of individual
attitudes in such cases." Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior, pp. 286-287.
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TABLE I
OBSCENITY DECISIONS

Scale
Position
12
12
12
11

Justice
Black
Douglas
Stewart
Hrlan
Brennan
Warren
Fortas
Goldberg
White
Clark
Frankfurter
Whittaker
Burton
Reed
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7
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900
99
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Blank-Not on Court at Time of Decision
[ ]-Inconsistent Vote

1957-66

--

33
66

44 56
331

2

1

1

0

12
33 3
17
6

.34
.5
.5
.67
-. 67

1250
4
3
1

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

106

0

6

LEGEND

CR=1-5/70=.93
CS=1-6/26=.75
A See Appendix for List of Cases
1. Butler v. Michigan, 353 U.S. 380, 77 S. Ct. 524, 1 L.Ed.2d.412 (1957). In favor of Plaintiff. Opinion-Frankfurter.
2. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d.1498 (1957) Against Defendant. Opinion-Brennan.
3. Kingsley Books Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436,77 S. Ct. 1325, 1L.Ed.2d.1469 (1957). Against Defendant. Opinion-Frankfurter.
4. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 80 S. Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d.205 (1959). In favor of Defendant. Opinion-Brennan.
5. Kingley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 79 S. Ct. 1362, 3 L.Ed.2d.1512 (1959). In favor of Defendant.
6. Manuel Enterprises Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 82 S. Ct. 1432, 8 L.Ed.2d.639 (1962). In favor of Defendant. OpinionHarlan.
7. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 83 S. Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d.584 (1963). In favor of Defendant.
8. Jacobelis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 84 S. Ct. 1676, 12 L.Ed.2d.793 (1964). In favor of Defendant. Opinion-Brennan.
9. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 84 S. Ct. 1723, 12 L.Ed.2d.809 (1964). In favor of Defendant.
Opinion-Brennan.
10. Ginsberg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463 (1966). Against Defendant. Opinion-Brennan.
11. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413 (1966). In favor of Defendant.
12. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502 (1966). Against Defendant. Opinion-Brennan.

For justices who have identical scale positions (Black, Douglas;
Brennan, Warren; Goldberg, White; Frankfurter, Whittaker; Burton,
Reed in our example), the following rules for breaking ties have been
adopted:
(1) Assign the higher position to the justice with the larger number of
positive votes.
(2) If (1) fails to break the tie, assign the higher position to the justice
with the least number of negative votes.
(3) If the tie still remains, position the justices alphabetically.
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We have now established our matrix. The decisions have been
placed horizontally and the justices ranked vertically. We must now
apply the two statistical tests to see if the variables under consideration,
do, in fact, scale.
The Coefficient of Reproducibility (CR) measures the percentage
of all votes cast which are consistent. Mathematically stated, CR - 1 .9 has been estabnumber of inconsistent votes.' 0 By convention, a CR
total number of votes
lished as indicating that the attitude scales unidimensionally. The CR
test, however, has troublesome problems associated with it. A large
number of unanimous or near-unanimous decisions in the set of cases
under study inevitably leads to satisfying the requirements of the test.
Obviously there can be no inconsistencies in 9-0 or 0-9 cases because of
the way in which we have grouped the cases. In addition, the probabilities of inconsistency in 7-2 and 2-7 decisions are quite low for the same
reason.
Because of this methodological bias, a new test was devised by
This test is known as the Coefficient of Scalability
Herbert Menzel."
(CS) which measures the percentage of potentially inconsistent votes
that are in fact consistent. A CS t .6 has been established by convention
as indicating the existence of a scalable attitude. Unfortunately, the CS
test also has a bias associated with it if the set of cases under study contains a large number of 5-4 splits. Tannehaus"2 argues that CR's and
CS's are too easily obtained. That is, we may be scaling nonsense and
obscuring it under the mantle of the Mathematical Mystique.
The preceding discussion makes it clear that the methodology of
cumulative scaling and the assumptions that must be made in scaling
(particularly, the assumption dealing with the positioning of the cases)
casts serious doubt on the reliability of this approach. We must ask the
obvious question, "Why scale?" We shall argue in the remainder of this
paper through our analysis of the obscenity decisions that scaling, in
spite of its problems, is a fruitful method of inquiry. The array of data
in the matrix does point up some non-obvious propositions which tend
to be obscured in a simple reading of the opinion. We can make some
"0We eliminate in this measure all decisions where 80% or more of the justices
were on one side in order to reduce the probabilities of creating an artificially high

CR.

"' Herbert Menzel, "A New Coefficient for Scalogram Analysis," 17 Public

Opinion Quarterly 268-280 (1953).
1

Joseph Tannehaus, op. cit., pp. 1592-1594.
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modest observations about the Court as a group without claiming that
our interpretation is truly scientific. Moreover, we feel we can predict
future court behavior in this area from our data and at end of the paper,
we shall set out some propositions for prediction. In general, then, we
are stating boldly that our understanding of the Court's attitudes on
obscenity has been significantly increased through the employment of the
scaling techniques.
Table I presents the scaled matrix for the obscenity decisions. The
array of data satisfies both statistical tests having a CR of .93 and a CS
of .75. However, we are skeptical of the scale for reasons made clear
in our critique of the methodology above. In addition, there is another
problem which must be identified. The rule in scaling is that there must
be a minimum of ten cases in which two or more justices dissented.
Eliminating the 9-0 and 8-1 decisions reduces our set of cases to eight,
two below the minimum. This scale, then, is properly described as a
quasi-scalogram. It is possible, nevertheless, to arrange the data in the
form of a scalogram as long as one understands that less powerful inferences can be drawn. 3
Since we are interested in decision-making by the personnel on the
current Court, we can eliminate from consideration Justices Goldberg,
Frankfurter, Whitaker, Burton, and Reed, all of whom have left the
Supreme Court.
There were six inconsistent votes registered in this group of cases,
five by Justice Harlan and one by the Chief Justice. Justice Harlan's
scale position of 11 places him in a more liberal position on this question
than either Brennan or Warren. On the other hand, his negative votes
in Bantam Books, A Quantity of Copies of Books, Jacobelis, Fanny Hill,
and Kingsley Books involve regulatory activities more restrictive than
the Roth case, his last positive vote and presumably his breakpoint. How
do we account for his erratic behavior?
If we turn to the opinion data, we discover that Harlan's perception
of the crucial question is not what we have scaled at all. The issue for him
is federalism and the crucial variable is whether the federal government
or the states are engaged in the regulation. His votes in favor of Roth
and Ginzberg in actions brought by the United States illustrate his oftstated position that the federal government's power to regulate obscenity
"aGlendon Schubert, "Civilian Control and Stare Decisis in the Warren Court,"
in Schubert, ed. JudicialDecision-Making, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1963, p. 58.
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is very limited. In cases involving federal regulation, he subscribes to the
Stewart position (to be described later in this paper) that only hard-core
pornography can be suppressed.' 4 For Harlan, it is in the nature of our
federalism that the states are empowered to protect society from the deleterious effects of obscene material. His position is worth quoting at some
length. 5
My premise is that in the area of obscenity the Constitution does not
bind the states and the Federal Government in precisely the same fashion. This approach is plainly consistent with the language of the First
and Fourteenth Amendment and, in my opinion, more responsive to the
proper functioning of a federal system of government in this area ....
Federal suppression of allegedly obscene matter should, in my view,
be constitutionally limited to that often described as 'hard core' pornography.
State obscenity laws present problems of quite a different order.
The varying conditions across 'the country, the range of views on the
need and reasons for curbing obscenity, and the traditions of local
self-government in matters of public welfare all favor a far more
flexible attitude in defining the bounds for the States. From my standpoint, the Fourteenth Amendment requires of a state only that it apply
criteria rationally related to the accepted notion of obscenity and that
it reach results not wholly out of step with current American standards .... There is plenty of room for disagreement in this area of constitutional law. Some will think that what I propose may encourage
states to go too far in -this field. Others will consider that the Court's
present course unduly restricts state experimentation with the still
elusive problem of obscenity. For myself, I believe it is the part of
wisdom for those of us who have the 'final word' to leave room for
such experimentation, which indeed is the underlying genius of our
federal system.
The remaining inconsisent vote was registered by Chief Justice Warren in Jacobelis v. Ohio. In that case, the manager of a motion picture
theatre had been convicted of violating an Ohio obscenity statute for
showing a French film entitled "The Lovers." The film was alleged to
be obscene because of several sexual references and depictions. On appeal,
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the conviction with Warren in dissent.
Since scalogram theory prescribes that the intensity of deprivation was
greater in this case than in subsequent cases in which the Chief Justice
voted in favor of the defendant, we must account for this inconsistency.
" A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).

" Id., p. 27-29.
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His dissent provides us with a satisfactory answer. Warren is in
dissent in Jacobelisin terms of neither the facts nor the constitutional law
involved. Rather he uses this case as a platform to plead with his
brethren to get out of the business of censorship 6except for those cases
where serious curtailment of liberty has occurred.'
In light of the foregoing, I would reiterate my acceptance of the
Roth test: Material is obscene and not constitutionally protected against
regulation and proscription if to the average person applying contemporary community standards the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest. I would commit the enforcement
of this rule to the appropriate state and federal courts, and I would
accept their judgement made pursuant to the Roth rule, limiting myself
to a consideration of whether there is sufficient evidence in the record
Protection of
upon which a finding of obscenity could be made ....
society's right to maintain its moral fiber and the effective administration of justice require that this Court not establish itself as an ultimate
censor, in each case reading the entire record, viewing the accused
material, and making an independent de novo judgement on the question of obscenity .... 17 This is the only way I can see to obviate the
necessity of this Court sitting as the Super Censor of all the obscenity
purveyed throughout the nation.
That the Court has accepted for review cases since Jacobelis illustrates
that Warren's recommendation was not adopted. In the later cases,
Warren resumed the judicial role of assessing the facts and applying the
test. His breakpoint comes in Ginzberg where he applies the Roth test
and presumably adopts the new dimension added to that test by Justice
Brennan for the majority.
Justice Clark's position presents us with no troublesome analytical
problem. He scales consistently shifting to a negative position following
Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan. His utter distaste for the "peddlers of
filth" is outlined in an enraged dissent in A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs" which gives the libertarians little reason to believe they could
ever obtain his vote in cases involving alleged obscenity.
Justice White has participated in only six of the twelve cases under
study. Like Harlan, White seems to make a distinction between federal
and state regulation although he did join the majority in Ginzberg. In
A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs," he stated :"s
6

v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
lacobelis
J
Emphasis added.
'8 Note 14 supra.
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But if a state insists on treating Fanny Hill as obscene and forbidding
its sale, the First Amendment does not prevent it from doing so ...

Fortas's recent appointment to the Court provides us with very sketchy
data for making an assessment of his attitudes on the question of obscenity.
In the three cases in which he has participated, he has joined the majority
voting in favor of the defendant in A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs" and against Ginzberg and Mishkin. Clearly, as a newcomer
to the Court, he is in the process of working out his position on all questions, this one included. We can only say at this moment that he seems
to subscribe to and accept the validity of the Roth test.
Brennan, whose general attitude on civil liberties might have led one
to believe he would have scaled higher (certainly higher than Harlan,
for example), has a certain amount of ego-involvement in cases of this
nature. Not only is he the author of the Roth test, but its chief amplifier.
It was Brennan writing for the majority in Ginzberg who added the new
dimension of pandering into the test. Clearly, his civil libertarian position in this area is relative subject to the application of his own test.
Turning now to Black, Douglas, and Stewart (all of whom have
identical scale positions) we can treat Black and Douglas as one unit but
Stewart's position must be analyzed separately.
In no instance has either Black or Douglas voted in favor of suppression. Having adopted an absolutist position, they would have the
court place alleged obscene material under the protection of the First
Amendment where the clear and present danger test could be applied
if such material led to the commission of antisocial acts. In their opinion,
all forms of censorship are prohibited by the First Amendment. Douglas
joined by Black in a concurring opinion in Friedman v. Maryland incisively states their position.19
I do not believe any form of censorship-no matter how speedy or
prolonged it may be-is permissible ...If censors are banned from the
publishing business, from the pulpit, from the public platform-as they
are-they should be banned from the theatre . . . . I would put an
end to all forms and types of censorship and give free literal meaning
to the command of the First Amendment.
Justice Stewart, however, does accept the exclusion of obscene materials from First Amendment protection. His difficulty with his brethren
on the Court centers on the difficult question, "What is obscenity?" For
" 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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Stewart, obscenity is hard-core pornography.
sees it.

And he knows it when he

20

I have reached the conclusion, which I think is confirmed at least by
negative implications in the court's decisions since Roth and Alberts,
that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this
area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to
,be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it...
In Ginzberg, Stewart again returns to the problem of defining the
qualities of obscenity :21

There does exist a distinct and identifiable class of material in
which all of these elements [here, referring to elements of the Roth
test] coalesce. It is that, and that alone which I think government
might constitutionally suppress, whether by criminal or civil sanctions.
I have referred to such material before as hard-core pornography, without further trying to define it.
Stewart has finally accepted a definition which satisfies his sense of
propriety by adopting the description of obscenity outlined by the
Solicitor-General in his brief in the Ginzsberg case.2"
Such materials include photographs, both still and motion pictures,
with no pretense to artistic value, graphically depicting acts of sexual
intercourse, including various acts of sodomy and sadism, and sometimes involving several participants in scenes of orgy-like character.
They also include strips of drawings in comic-book -format grossly
depicting similar activities in an exaggerated fashion. There are, in
addition, pamphlets and booklets, sometimes with photographic illustrations, verbally describing such activities in a bizarre manner with no
attempt whatsoever to afford portrayals of character or situation and
with no pretense to literary value.

All of this material . . . cannot

conceivably be characterized as embodying communication of ideas or
artistic values inviolate under the First Amendment ...
Stewart's acceptance of this definition would seem to imply that he
has a zone of indecision at which point he would vote in favor of suppression of the material. It is interesting to note, however, that that
"°Note 16, supra.

" Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
Ibid.

22

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2017

11

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 4
26

NORTH CAROLINA COLLEGE LAW JOURNAL

kind of obscenity has never reached the Court for review and given the
nature of its private, underground circulation, probably never will.
In summary, then, we can expect the following behavior from the
Court on future cases involving alleged obscene matter.
(1) Black and Douglas will always vote in favor of the defendant or
against suppression at least (if ever) until the Court brings obscenity under the protection of the First Amendment.
(2) Stewart will invariably join Black and Douglas since it is unlikely the Court will ever review materials falling within his
definition of hard-core pornography.
(3) Harlan will join the above group in all federal prosecutions but
will side with those below in state prosecutions.
(4) Brennan, Warren, and White will continue to apply the Roth test
23
usually finding against the defendant in cases similar to Ginzsberg
and always in cases similar to Mishkin.
(5) Clark will always vote against the defendant24except in those cases
where the prohibition is manifestly unfair.
In federal prosecutions the Court will initially split 4 (Douglas,
Black, Stewart, Harlan)--4 (Clark, Warren, Brennan, White) with
Fortas's position uncertain. The application of the Roth test then will
determine the outcome in light of what was said in (4) above.
In state prosecutions, the proponents of unrestricted reading face a
more difficult court. For the liberals on the bench will lose the support
of Harlan, thereby requiring that they pick up two votes from the Roth
test appliers.
8 We hedge here with the phrase "usually finding against the defendant" because Ginzberg constitutes the zone of indecision at least for Warren and Brennan.
" It is extremely unlikely that Clark would dissent alone, for example.
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